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1 Perspectives and resources from John Dewey and other classical pragmatists have been
applied  in  contemporary  political  philosophy  for  some  time.  Yet  Roberto  Frega’s
Pragmatism and the Wide View of Democracy (2019) is to date the most comprehensive and
ambitious attempt to draw on several such resources and to develop them within a
systematic account of democracy. Frega not only applies Dewey’s seminal conception of
the public but also ontological perspectives drawn from Dewey and other pragmatists.
Frega’s  book  is  a  major  achievement  that  deserves  to  be  seriously  considered  and
extensively discussed by everyone who thinks classical pragmatism has something to
offer political philosophy. In this paper, however, I will only consider certain aspects of
Frega’s project that concern his use and development of resources from Dewey. Firstly,
I  consider how Frega updates and develops Dewey’s wide conception of democracy.
While Dewey famously explores the idea of democracy as a social ideal to be applied
across institutional contexts, Frega develops a normative concept of democracy which
is sociologically informed by social interactionism, construed broadly as encompassing
classical  sources,  such  as  Dewey,  George  Herbert  Mead  and  the  Chicago  school  of
sociology,  as  well  as  the  more  recent  contributions  of  Ervin  Goffman  and  Harold
Garfinkel.  Frega’s  approach follows  Dewey  in  providing  an  account  of  democracy
through considering immanent features of social life. I briefly point out that Frega’s
proposed  distinction  between  ontological  principles  that  generate  and  structurate
social  reality  on  the  level  of  “habits,”  “patterns  of  interaction”  and  “forms  of
institutional organization” (2019: 90), parallells a similar distinction found in Dewey’s
social theory. However, Frega’s further attempt (2019: 131) to base a pragmatist social
ontology on Dewey’s notion of association calls for more consideration and discussion.
In particular, I show how this notion should be articulated in terms of Dewey’s inclusive
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conceptualisation of the social1 – or the social taken as incorporating or integrating
biophysical, technological, and psychological processes. This inclusive conception bears
on Dewey’s social and political theory through his considerations of human agency.
Through an inclusive conceptualisation of the social, he sees human and social agents
as involved in processes of  production and consumption in which technologies and
biophysical  elements  condition  and  inform  their  opportunities,  dependencies  and
vulnerabilities.  Notably,  Dewey’s  inclusive  conceptualisation  of  the  social  would
conflict with the ways in which sociologists have conceptualised the social as sui generis,
starting  with Émile  Durkheim  (1982  [1895]).  Following  Anne  Warfield  Rawls’
interpretation (1987, 2009), even Goffman and Garfinkel can be seen as committed to
ways  of  conceptualising  the  social  as  sui  generis.  In  building  on  Goffman’s  and
Garfinkel’s accounts, Frega’s social interactionist approach, too, would be committed to
a conceptualisation of the social as sui generis. 
2 Turning to Frega’s use Dewey’s conception of the public, I further consider ontological
underpinnings for this conception. While Frega suggests that Dewey’s conception of the
public could be supported by the Human Ecology of the Chicago school of sociology, I
point out differences as well as commonalities between Dewey’s social ontology and the
Human  Ecology  as  oulined  by  Robert  Park  and  Ernest  Burgess  (1921)  and  later
elaborated by Park (1936). Moreover, given that Dewey’s conception of the public is
based in a notion of “common affectedness” (Frega 2019: 188), I endeavour to show how
the  latter  notion  can  be  spelled  out  in  terms  of  vulnerabilities  and  dependencies
highlighted by Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation of the social. 
3 Although  in  building  on  Goffmann  and  Garfinkel  Frega  would  be  committed  to  a
conception of  the  social  as  sui  generis,  his  use  of  Dewey’s  conception of  the  public
further suggests that Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation would be relevant or even
required. I therefore briefly suggest how Frega’s pragmatist social ontology could be
expanded by revisiting and requalifying his triadic distinction of ontological principles
of social reality (habits, patterns of interaction, forms of institutional organisation) in
the light of  Dewey’s  inclusive conceptualisation of  the social.  Finally,  I  present two
further reasons for considering Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation in spelling out a
pragmatist ontology: firstly, it would be consistent with the naturalistic underpinnings
of  George Herbert  Mead’s  social  theory (1934);  and,  secondly,  it  could enhance the
relevance of  Frega’s  ontologically  based theory of  democracy in addressing current
global challenges.
 
2. Updating Dewey’s Conception of Democracy and
Developing Its Sociological Basis
4 Preparing  ground  for  his  project  Frega  points  out  that  “the  distinctive  feature  of
political  pragmatism”  lies  in  pragmatists’  “original  social-theoretic  account  of  the
constitutive features of a democratic society, of democracy as a form of society” (2019:
113). As Frega rightly suggests, this interpretation holds not only for thinkers we may
think of as sociologists, such as Robert E. Park and George Herbert Mead, but also for
John Dewey, the most influential political philosopher in the pragmatist tradition. In
fact, as Frega makes clear, Dewey outlines elements of a social theory as a basis for his
conception of democracy, perhaps most famously in Democracy and Education (DE). He
here presents his wide conception of democracy as “more than a form of government”
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and as “primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience”
(MW9:  93).  To  sustain  his  conception  of  democracy  Dewey  presents  sociological
perspectives  stressing  the  centrality  of  communication  for  social  reproduction  of
norms and ideals, as well as for socialisation.2 “Society not only continues to exist by
transmission, by communication,” Dewey thinks, “but it may fairly be said to exist in
transmission,  in communication”  (MW9:  7).  More  specifically,  Dewey  analyses  how
individuals through communication may consent to plans of action,3 and also benefit
from  the  community’s  fund  of  cultural  and  intellectual  resources.4 While  briefly
suggesting  the  mechanism  of  perspective  taking,  which  was  later  theoretically
elaborated  by  George  Herbert  Mead  (1934),5 Dewey’s  sociological  perspectives  on
communication  became  a  focal  point  for  the  Chicago  school  of  sociology  through
Robert E. Park and Ernest Burgess’ Introduction to the science of sociology (1921).6 In fact,
by relating Dewey’s  brief  analysis  of  communication to Émile  Durkeim’s  concept  of
collective representations, Park and Burgess even suggest that Dewey’s analysis may be
“taken as a description of the process by which these collective representations come
into  existence”  (1921:  38).  Nevertheless,  Dewey’s  analysis  of  communication  in  DE
remains sketchy at best, and Park and the Chicago school never developed a full fledged
(or consistent) theory of society.7 It is thus to be welcomed that Frega elaborates on this
theoretically rich yet underdeveloped legacy of Park and Dewey. I will briefly focus on
some aspects of Frega’s development of this legacy. 
5 In qualifying his approach to social ontology as “social interactionist” (2019: 89), Frega
takes Dewey, Park and the early Chicago school as part of the same tradition, and he
includes also the more recent contributions of Ervin Goffman and Harold Garfinkel.
Through following leads of  his  theoretical  predecessors,  Frega wants to reconstruct
patterns of social interaction of which the predicate “democratic” may be applied, and
which  further  may  serve as  building  blocks  for  extending  the  application  of  the
predicate  to  “the  largest  possible  domains  of  social  life,  from  basic  face-to-face
interactions to formal political institutions” (2019: 78). As a theoretical strategy this
approach could be seen as an updated elaboration of Dewey’s efforts in DE to develop a
wide concept of democracy by extracting “desirable traits of forms of community life
which actually exist” (MW9: 88-9).  Like Dewey, Frega aims to establish a concept of
democracy  through  considering  immanent  features  of  social  life.  Yet,  tuned  also
toward contemporary political-theoretical distinctions,  Frega goes on to reconstruct
three major patterns or principles. Relational parity concerns interaction as symmetrical
and not status-dependent; inclusive authority stresses that individuals are to be authors
of the decisions whose consequences they will undergo; and social involvement refers to
a  social  unit’s  capacity  to  involve  its  members  in  practices  having  in  view  some
common good.8 Frega qualifies a concept of democracy based on these three principles
as a “paradigm normative concept.”9 Like philosophical projects that put emphasis on
other master concepts, like justice or non-domination, he thus explores a concept of
democracy that could, via empirical cues and examples, be applicable across various
domains of social life, and not only in an institutionalised political sphere. In order to
extend his application of the concept of democracy to such various domains,  Frega
(2019: 90) introduces an ontological division between three different levels or strata:
“democratic habits”; “democratic patterns of interaction” (or democratic “collective
habits”);  and “democratic forms of institutional organization.” To some extent,  this
division parallells Dewey’s distinction in Lectures in China between habits, customs and
institutions as “broad categories of human activity” (LC: 85) that are to provide criteria
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for normative assessment of how social arrangements contribute to “human welfare
and freedom” (LC: 84). In this perspective, Frega may be seen to significantly update
Dewey by drawing on Structuration Theory (Giddens 1984) and by taking the triadic
division as principles that generate and structurate social reality so that the various
levels  are  “in  constant  interaction  and  influence  each  other”  (2019:  90).  Yet,  a
transition to social ontology is in line with the Deweyan legacy and Frega (2019: 131) in
fact  appeals  to  Dewey’s  ontological  exploration  of  the  notion  of  association.
Nevertheless,  this  abstract  strand  of  Dewey’s  social  thought  calls  for  more
consideration and discussion, not only in the light of other interpretations that put
emphasis on Dewey’s concept of habit, like that of Italo Testa (2016). My concern is
rather that Dewey develops his notion of association in ways that would not necessarily
accord with ontological  presuppositions  of  the  social  interactionist  tradition in  the
broad sense at stake. 
6 Dewey develops his notion of association in two steps. Firstly, as Frega points out, he
defines the notion in an ontologically generalised sense. Association, Dewey thinks, is
not a unique trait of humans and human societies: all  other animate beings and all
inanimate things are associated in the generalised sense in which both humans or “
atoms and physical  massesˮ  are  seen as  “being  acted  upon by  and affecting  other
things”  (LW1:  138).  Hence,  “associated  or  conjoint  behaviour”  could  be  seen  as  “a
universal characteristic of all existences” (LW3: 41). Secondly, however, Dewey goes on
to qualify  the category of  human association in an inclusive sense.  He thus aims to
conceptualise  ways  in  which  social  phenomena  and  processes  may  be  taken  to
incorporate  or  integrate  physical, technological,  biological,  as  well  as  psychological
processes (or “associations”). Rejecting various forms of reductionism,10 he endeavours
to  understand  social  phenomena  in  their  “complexity”  (LW3:  44)  and  to  take  “the
social,  in its human sense” as “the richest, fullest and most delicately subtle of any
mode  [of  association]  actually experienced”  (LW3:  44).  Sociologically,  the  inclusive
conceptualisation supports consideration of how social organisation is conditioned and
enabled by  biological  processes  and by physical  and technological  infrastructures.11
Yet, Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation particularly matters for his social and political
theory  through considerations  of  human agency.  As  I  return to  below,  through an
inclusive conceptualisation, he sees human and social agents as involved in processes of
production and consumption in which technologies and biophysical elements condition
and inform their opportunities, dependencies and vulnerabilities.12 
7 By  considering  and  including  biophysical  processes  and  natural  and  technological
infrastructures  in  his  conceptualisation  of  the  social,  Dewey  challenges
conceptualisations  of  the  social  as  sui  generis in  sociology.  While  the  classical
conceptualisation of the social as sui generis is found in Durkheim’s work (1982 [1895]),
there are other and more recent attempts that bear directly on Frega’s project, such as
those  of  Goffman  and  Garfinkel.  Anne  Warfield  Rawls  (1987)  has  pointed  out  how
Goffman’s outline of a theory of an interaction order is an attempt to conceptualise social
order  as  sui  generis.  An  interaction  order  in  Goffman’s  sense  involves  interactional
constraints that are not to be derived from an institutional order, nor from individuals
or from aggregated effects or effects of routinization. An interaction order would thus
be a distinct social entity sui generis.  As Warfield Rawls has suggested more recently
(2009),  Garfinkel’s  concept  of  a  “constitutional  orderˮ  is  a  comparable  effort  to
conceptualise social order. Hence, in building on Goffman’s and Garfinkel’s concepts of
social  order  in  developing his  interactionist  account  of  democracy,  Frega would be
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committed to a conception of the social as sui generis. In so far, his approach would thus
be equipped to account for social interaction without having to consider psychological
and biophysical processes or technologies. 
8 Nevertheless, Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation of the social would still be relevant
for Frega’s project. For example, in considering democracy as “a form of life” Frega
notes that “[t]he notion of forms of life connects human experience with the larger
space  of  nature,”  and  that  “[s]peaking  of  forms  of  life  means  challenging  the
boundaries that separate culture and nature, with the aim of making more visible the
entanglement between these two dimensions” (2019: 57). However, Dewey’s inclusive
conceptualisation  bears  more  profoundly  on  Frega’s  use  of  Dewey’s  concept  of  the
public. 
 
3. The Public, Dewey’s Inclusive Conceptualisation of
The Social and Human Ecology
9 Frega’s project includes an account of democracy as social order but also “a theory of
democracy as collective action” (2019: 65). In developing the latter, he employs Dewey’s
conception of the public, as well as other pragmatist approaches, to focus on various
aspects of “democratic approaches to social problems” and on “the capacities and the
conditions  which  enable  and  constrain  forms  of  political  activation”  (2019:  159).
Following Dewey’s  and other  pragmatists’  accounts,  he  sees  collective  activation as
taking place  when agents  need to  amend practices  and institutions  “in  the  face  of
changes  in  the  social  and natural  environment”  (2019:  160).  As  Frega  makes  clear,
Dewey’s concept of the public, which turns on “indirect consequences of transactions,”
focuses more specifically on “human affectedness, on the existence of a public as the
collective body composed of all those who are affected” (2019: 188). While a public must
become  aware  of  its  “common-affectedness”  in  order  to  come  into  existence,  the
constitution of a public is originally sparked by “the need to control the circumstances
of social and natural life” (2019: 190). On this account, political institutions have thus
arisen “against the background of the ecological sea changes which, by transforming
relationships between individuals, human groups, and the environment, required new
and more complex forms of organized action” (2019: 190). Frega proposes that the term
“ecological”  could  be  understood  here  in  the  sense  of  the  Human  Ecology  of  the
Chicago school of sociology.13 Although Frega rightly suggests that both Dewey and the
originators  of  the  Human  Ecology  framework  take  steps  to  develop  a  naturalistic
ontology, Dewey’s social ontology and the Human Ecology as outlined by Robert Park
and Ernest Burgess (1921), and later elaborated by Park (1936), have crucial differences,
as well as commonalities.14 Let us consider differences before turning to commonalities.
10 Human  Ecology  would  differ  from  Dewey’s  ontological  outlook  with  regard  to  the
conceptualisation of human agency. Elaborating on Darwin’s notion of “the struggle for
existence,” Park and Burgess put emphasis on competition as “the elementary, universal,
and fundamental form” of interaction (1921: 507). Competition for material resources
and  territory  is  construed  as  an  unconscious  biotic  process  between  human
individuals15 that  determines  their  distribution  in  space  and  that  underlies  the
economic  organisation  of  society.  Although  competition  would  be  constrained  by
“custom  and  consensus”  in  human  societies  (Park  1936:  13),  Park  conceives  the
individual  as  belonging  to  a  “biotic  substructure,”  as  well  as  to  a  “cultural
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superstructure” (1936: 13). However, this idea of biotic processes of competition as the
most basic level of human agency differs significantly from Dewey’s understanding of
human agency.  Dewey’s  inclusive  conceptualisation  of  the  social  does  not  isolate  a
biological dimension of human agency or privilege it over social or cultural dimensions,
nor does it assume any direct link between biotic and economic processes in terms of
“competition.”  His  inclusive  conceptualisation  rather  focuses  on  how  human
vulnerabilities and opportunities are biologically conditioned, as shown by childrens’
immaturity and need of care and education,16 and by the need for adequate food.17 In
particular, through processes of production and consumption, human opportunities,
vulnerabilities  and  dependencies  are  conditioned  and  informed  by  technological
artefacts and services and by access to natural resources.18 In a normative perspective,
Dewey’s  emphasis  on biologically and technologically conditioned vulnerabilities,  as
well  as  opportunities,  contrasts  sharply  with  Park’s  more  direct  and  positive  link
between “the freedom of the individual” and competition as a biotic process (1936: 13).
11 Park’s and Burgess’  Human Ecology further suggests general conditions for political
activation and action that both compares to and differs from Dewey’s  approach.  In
construing  competition  as  the  most  fundamental  form  of  human  interaction,  the
human ecologist takes it to be the first stage in an ordered sequence of different forms
of interaction. On this account, competition conditions and enables conflict conceived as
a conscious of form of interaction and as a distinctively political process. “It is only in
periods of crisis,” Park and Burgess hold, “when men are making new and conscious
efforts to control the conditions of their common life, that […] competition is converted
into  conflict.  It  is  in  what  has  been  described  as  the  political  process that  society
consciously deals with its crises […]” (1921: 510). In fact, Dewey’s approach in The Public
and Its Problems (TPIP) tends to converge with Human Ecology on the assumption that
political  action  arises  from  perceived  problematic  consequences  of  social,  and  in
particular, economic activities.  In fact,  Dewey would agree with Park’s and Burgess’
suggestion that political action emerges from a perceived need to control conditions
under which economic activities go on.19 Yet, again, Dewey’s approach differs from that
of  Park  and  Burgess  in  seeing  action  consequences  as  problematic,  not  due  to
competing biotic agents and their “freedom,” but rather as due to the vulnerability and
affectedness of  fullblown human agents.  He provides examples of  the affected public
from the 1920s that succinctly bring out this point: child workers, women workers with
no protection of their maternal health, workers with no old age pension or minimal
wage,  and  farmers  suffering  from  heavy  mortgages  and  oscillating  prices  on  farm
products and agricultural  implements.20 As Dewey suggests in his lectures on social
philosophy,21 understanding human vulnerabilities and ways of being affected requires
consideration of natural and technological conditions for economic activities and for
different modes of consumption in particular. Hence, human biological aptitudes and
potentials,  as well as land, natural resources, and vital technological infrastructures
and services (such as electricity), must be included in the social and should further be
seen  as  enabling  conditions  for  human  opportunities  over  which  the  polity  needs
sufficient control in order to provide for the affected public.22 
12 Through  the  inclusion  of  land,  natural  resources,  and  technology  in  the
conceptualisation of the social Dewey’s social ontology becomes ecologically relevant,
as suggested by Frega. In fact, Dewey sometimes considers the “ruthless exploitation of
natural resources without reference to conservation for future users” (MW15: 262), as
well as the “brutal exploitation of nature and man in times of peace” (LW2: 344). Yet, if
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we look for relevant sources of inspiration, Thorstein Veblen and his account of various
modes of consumption should be considered,23 rather than the Human Ecology outlined
by Park and Burgess. Nevertheless, Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation of the social
and  the  Human  Ecology  of  the  Chicago  school  could  be  seen  to  share  a  general
ontological orientation. In his later development of Human Ecology, Park takes pains to
include not only population and biotic processes but “technological culture” and “the
natural resources of the habitat” as constitutive elements of society, as well as “custom
and beliefsˮ  (or “non-material culture”) (1936: 15). This conceptualisation of society
thus broadly corresponds to basic elements in Dewey’s inclusive definition of the social.
By considering and including biophysical processes, natural resources and technology,
both  Dewey  and  Park  challenge  conceptualisations  of  the  social  as  sui  generis in
sociology. 
13 As pointed out above, in building on Goffman’s and Garfinkel’s concepts of social order,
Frega would be committed to a conception of the social as sui generis. However, Frega’s
use  of Dewey’s  conception  of  the  public  comes  with  a  wider  set  of  ontological
commitments.  Moreover,  in  view of  Frega’s  expressed aim to  develop a  pragmatist
social  ontology  inspired  by  Dewey’s  notion  of association,  I  therefore  revisit  his
ontological  distinction  between  habits,  patterns  of  interaction  and  forms  of
institutional  organisation in  the  light  of  Dewey’s  inclusive  conceptualisation of  the
social. 
 
4. A Pragmatist and Inclusive Social Ontology: Habits,
Patterns of Interaction and Institutional Forms
14 Suggesting his tripartite distinction as “principles that generate and structurate social
reality”  (2019:  86)  Frega  wants  to  take  into  account  of  how  habits,  patterns  of
interaction and forms of  institutional  organisation “are in constant interaction and
influence each other, contributing together to shape social life” (2019: 90). As for the
category of habit, however, it fits uneasily within an account of the social as sui generis. 
Already in American sociology in the 1920s the concept of habit was seen as “closely
associated with psychology” and thus as jeopardising the autonomy of sociology – or it
was rather taken belong to “the biological field” (Camic 1986: 1071-2). The tendency in
sociology to reject this concept contrasts sharply with central role given to it in Human
Nature and Conduct where Dewey aims to integrate biological perspectives, seeing habits
as concretely embodied in involving “skill of sensory and motor organs” (MW15: 15)
and  as  “requiring  the  cooperation  of  organism  and  environment”  (MW14:  15).  He
further  integrates  sociological  perspectives,  conceiving  “habits  as  social  functions”
(MW14:  15),  as  well  as  psychological  perspectives,  in  stressing  how  reflective  habits
involve  mental  capacities  and  aptitudes  through  the  work  of  imagination  (MW14:
132-5). Frega subscribes to Dewey’s account of habit as “an acquired predisposition to
ways or modes of response” and as concerning “the patterns of interaction between an
agent and his/her environment” (2019: 231). He further conceives habits in a Deweyan
way as incorporating “perceptive, affective, and reflexive features” (2019: 230), taking
their  “reflective  dimensionˮ  to  be  “operational  and  embodied”  (2019:  230).  More
generally, he holds that “[t]he pragmatist human agent is an embodied social actor”
(2019: 128). The underlying ontological commitments for using the concept of habit,
however,  can  be  articulated  in  terms of  Dewey’s  inclusive  conceptualisation  of  the
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social and would involve rejection of possible reconstructions (and reductions) of the
concept in terms of the social sui generis. 
15 As  for  the  level  of social  interaction,  we  may  further  note  how  Dewey  draws  on
biological  and  psychological  perspectives  in  conceptualising  conditions  for  human
communication. While taking “[o]rganic and psycho-physical activities” as a condition
for  “the  presence  and  operation  of  meanings”  (LW1:  220),  he  sees  sentience as  “an
indispensable means of any noetic function” (LW1: 199). Moreover, Dewey’s stress on
the role of sentience in human communication bears on his account of democracy and
democratic  processes.  Notably,  he  thinks  that  emotional  as  well  as  intellectual
consensus serves as a criterion for the moral rightness of a claim.24 More specificly, he
takes “[t]he emotion of sympathy” to provide a basis for taking other persons’ points of
view and  thus  enabling  consideration  of  “what  justice  demands  in  concrete  cases”
(LW7:  251).  Sympathy  further  enables  consideration  of  how “the  welfare  of  all  [is]
affected by conduct” im-partial (LW7: 259). Dewey’s stress on human sentience would
be  relevant  for  Frega’s  theory  of  democracy  as  well,  in  particular  for  his  critical
appropriation of Habermas. Frega finds that Habermas “focuses too much upon the
linguistic dimension of discourses,” while pragmatists “embody rationality in a thicker
concept of experience which never loose sight of the deeper interdependencies of the
mind  with  the  body  and  with the  outer  world”  (2019:  260-1).  Again,  however,  an
appreciation of Dewey’s relevance could be further articulated and sustained through
his inclusive conceptualisation of the social. 
16 Finally,  Dewey’s  inclusive conceptualisation would bear on the level  of  institutional
organisation, as  well  as  on  the  level  of  interaction,  with  regard  to  the  role  of
technologies.  In  ways  recalling  Benedict  Anderson’s  historical  thesis  of  “imagined
communities” (1991 [1983]),  Dewey in TPIP considers how modern technologies and
news media have enabled the sense of  belonging to  communities  which extend far
beyond face-to-face  interactions.  In  industrialised  nations,  he  observes,  “[r]ailways,
travel and transportation, commerce, the mails, telegraph and telephone, newspapers,
create enough similarity of ideas and sentiments to keep the thing going as a whole, for
they create interaction and interdependence” (LW2: 306). In other works he considers
how new possibilities for sharing and discussing ideas “in areas of social concern” have
been opened by new communication technologies (LC: 170). Moreover, he suggests that
these possibilities could be developed on the model of international scientific forums
for  publishing  and  scrutinising  knowledge  claims.  He  thus  projects  an  ideal  public
sphere which would be enabled and sustained by “the telephone, the telegraph, the
radio, the transoceanic cables” (LC: 170) – and which may be sharply contrasted with
prevailing  practices  in  business  and  diplomacy  of  keeping  information  secret.25
Moreover, he speculates how people could contribute to a public fund of knowledge
which “can be shared and increased at the same time” (LC: 178). Like scientific forums,
such knowledge fund should not be organised through the imperatives and forces of
the market, but would rather amount to a “socialism of knowledge” (LC: 178). Yet, he
suggests elsewhere, such knowledge fund could enable political and democratic control
of market forces and also sustain modes of production and consumption not subjected
to these forces.26 Dewey’s projected ideal could be interestingly compared to Frega’s
consideration  of  emerging  economic  practices  of  peer-production  for  creating  and
sustaining digital commons.  Enabled by the internet these collaborative practices are,
Frega  points  out, “expanding  the  scope  of  non-market and  non-state  models  of
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production and consumption” (2019: 350), and they have democratising effects through
“reducing  impact  of  hierarchical  mechanisms  of  coordination”  and  through  “high
levels  of  decentralization”  (2019:  353).  Hence,  he  thinks  that  “peer-production  and
knowledge commons create opportunities for a more democratic form of society right
at the heart of its technological core” (2019: 352).  Although digital commons would
normally fall short of providing democratic control as conceived by Dewey, their ways
of producing, storing and sharing knowledge of interest to members are comparable to
Dewey’s imagined knowledge fund. Moreover, while Dewey suggests that his knowledge
fund could be sustained by transoceanic cables, telephones and radio receivers, digital
commons  are  in  fact  enabled,  structured  and  sustained  by  the  technological
infrastructure  of  the  internet.  More  generally,  by  showing  how  communication
technologies create new potentials for initiating and coordinating social action across
national  borders  and  for  building  and  organising  transnational  communities,  the
example  of  digital  commons  suggests  the  relevance  of  Dewey’s  inclusive
conceptualisation of the social. Considering also how digital commons involve modes of
production and consumption that have emerged in response to prevailing forces of the
market,  Dewey’s  inclusive  conceptualisation again proves  relevant  in  stressing how
human  opportunities  and  vulnerabilities  arise  through  modes  of  production  and
consumption and thus through technological dependencies. Hence, in emphasising the
role of economic activities,  Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation, along with Veblen’s
social  thought,  could provide a critical  complementation of the social  interactionist
ontology developed in the earlier chapters of Frega’s book.
 
5. Concluding Remarks
17 Frega’s theory of democracy significantly develops and updates Dewey’s conception of
democracy  in  the  context  of  20th  century  sociology  and  contemporary  political
philosophy.  His  theory  interestingly  links  up  with  ontological  considerations  in
Dewey’s  and  other  pragmatists’  work.  Yet,  as  suggested  by  his  use  of  Dewey’s
conception of the public in particular, a pragmatist social ontology could be further
articulated in terms of Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation of the social. I will end by
presenting  two  further  reasons  for  considering  a  social  ontology  along  the  lines
suggested  above.  Firstly,  in  distinguishing  a  pragmatist  social  ontology  from
conceptions of the social as sui generis, one would find support not only in Dewey’s work
but also in that of George Herbert Mead, a pragmatist thinker even more intimately
linked to developments in the social interactionist tradition as conceived by Frega. In
Mead’s work (1934), as well as in that of Dewey, the concept of habit plays a central role
and should be spelled out in terms of biological endowments and biophysical processes,
as suggested also by Mead’s concept “the biologic individual.”27 In sociology, this part
of  Mead’s  legacy  has  largerly  been  left  behind,  probably  because  “most  symbolic
interactionists overlook the biological dimension in Mead’s thought” (Cohen 2000: 87).
Recovering  this  biological  dimension  may be  taken as  imperative  in  spelling  out  a
pragmatist social ontology, particularly so since part of Mead’s work is of a general
philosophical nature28 and could serve as an important source, together with Dewey’s
work. 
18 All  exegetical  considerations of  classical  pragmatism or pragmatists aside,  however,
there is another reason for taking Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation of the social into
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account.  On  Frega’s  interpretation,  Dewey’s  conception  of  the  public  focuses  on
“human  affectedness”  (2019:  188)  and  on  an  “awareness  of  a  shared  affectedness”
(2019: 359). In later chapters of his book he applies Dewey’s conception in addressing
global challenges and in thus considering “transnational publics brought to life by the
awareness of a shared affectedness produced by the global reach of risks related to
environment, security, health, social welfare” (2019: 359). Yet, the relevance of Dewey’s
concept,  and hence of  Frega’s  account of  democracy,  could be further enhanced by
spelling out the notion of affectedness in terms of vulnerabilities and dependencies
captured by Dewey’s inclusive conceptualisation of the social. If specified in terms of
biologically conditioned vulnerabilities and technologically conditioned dependencies,
a  shared  affectedness  regarding  environmental  risks  and  health  risks  in  particular
could become an even more central focus in a pragmatist account of democracy. That
would in turn support the relevance of  a  pragmatist  account in addressing current
global challenges. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ANDERSON Benedict, (1991 [1983]), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, revised and extended edition, London, Verso.
BULMER Martin, (1984), The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of
Sociological Research, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press.
CAMIC Charles, (1986), “The Matter of Habit,ˮ American Journal of Sociology, 91 (5), 1039-87.
COHEN Ira J., (2000), “Theories of Action and Praxis,ˮ in Bryan S. Turner (ed.), The Blackwell
Companion to Social Theory, Malden, Mass, Blackwell Publishers, 73-111.
DEEN Phillip, (2016), “Recontextualizing John Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems,ˮ History of
Political Thought, 37 (3), 509-29. 
DEWEY John, (1928), “Social Philosophy,” (Lecture Notes), Box 33, Folder 9, John Dewey papers,
1858-1970, Special Collections Research Center, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale.
DEWEY John, (1973), Lectures in China, 1919-1920, transl. and ed. R. W. Clopston and T.-C. Ou,
Honolulu, The University of Honolulu Press. References to this work are indicated by LC followed
by page numbers.
DEWEY John, (1976-1983), The Middle Works, 1899-1924, 15 volumes, ed. J. A. Boydston, Carbondale,
IL, Southern Illinois University Press. Citations of items in this edition are indicated by MW
followed by volume and page numbers.
DEWEY John, (1981-1992), The Later Works, 1925-1953, 17 volumes, ed. J. A. Boydston, Carbondale, IL,
Southern Illinois University Press. Citations of items in this edition are indicated by LW followed
by volume and page numbers.
DEWEY John, (2015), “Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy,ˮ European Journal of Pragmatism
and American Philosophy, (7) 2, 1-39. [journals.openedition.org/ejpap/404].
A Wide View of Democracy and An Inclusive Conception of The Social
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
10
DURKHEIM Émile, (1982 [1895]), The Rules of Sociological Method, ed. Steven Lukes, trans. W. D. Halls,
New York, NY, The Free Press.
FREGA Roberto, (2019), Pragmatism and the Wide View of Democracy, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan.
GIDDENS Anthony, (1984), The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Cambridge,
Polity Press.
HELMES-HAYES Richard C., (1987), “‘A Dualistic Vision’: Robert Ezra Park and the Classical
Ecological Theory of Social Inequality,ˮ The Sociological Quarterly, 28 (3), 387-409.
MCDONALD Dennis W., (2011), “Beyond the Group: The Implications of Roderick D. McKenzie’s
Human Ecology for Reconceptualizing Society and the Social,ˮ Nature and Culture, 6 (3), 263-84. 
MCKENZIE Roderick Duncan, (1924), “The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human
Community,ˮ American Journal of Sociology, 30 (3), 287-301. 
MEAD George Herbert, (1932), The Philosophy of the Present, ed. Arthur E. Murphy, La Salle, IL, Open
Court.
MEAD George Herbert, (1934), Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, ed. C.
W. Morris. Chicago, University of Chicago.
MEAD Georg Herbert, (1938), The Philosophy of the Act, ed. Charles W. Morris, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press.
MIDTGARDEN Torjus, (2019), “Dewey’s Conceptualization of the Public as Polity Contextualized: The
Struggle for Democratic Control over Natural Resources and Technology,ˮ Contemporary
Pragmatism, 16 (1), 104-31. 
PARK Robert E. & Ernest W. BURGESS, (1921), Introduction to the Science of Sociology, Chicago, IL, The
University of Chicago Press.
PARK Robert E., (1936), “Human Ecology,” American Journal of Sociology, 42 (1), 1-15.
SHILS Edward, (1948), The Present State of American Sociology, Glencoe, IL, Free Press. 
TESTA Italo, (2016), “Dewey’s Social Ontology: A Pragmatist Alternative to Searle’s Approach to
Social Reality,ˮ International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 25 (1), 40-62. 
TILMAN Rick, (1998), “John Dewey as User and Critic of Thorstein Veblen's Ideas,ˮ Journal of the
History of Economic Thought, 20 (2), 145-60. 
TILMAN Rick & Terry KNAPP, (1999), “John Dewey’s unknown critique of Marginal Utility Doctrine:
Instrumentalism, Motivation, and Values,ˮ Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 35 (4),
391-408.
WARFIELD RAWLS Anne, (1987), “The Interaction Order Sui Generis: Goffman’s Contribution to Social
Theory,ˮ Sociological Theory, 5 (2), 136-49.
WARFIELDS RAWLS Anne, (2009), “An Essay on Two Conceptions of Social Order: Constitutive Orders
of Action, Objects and Identities vs Aggregated Orders of Individual Action,ˮ Journal of Classical
Sociology, 9 (4), 500-20. 
A Wide View of Democracy and An Inclusive Conception of The Social
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
11
NOTES
1. Dewey develops his inclusive conceptualisation of the social in the text to which Frega refers
(“The Inclusive Philosophical Idea” [LW3: 41-54]) but also in his lectures on social and political
philosophy during the years 1923-1928 (see footnote 12 below). 
2. See MW9: 5-7.
3. See MW9: 8.
4. “By [language] we are led to share vicariously in past human experience, thus widening and
enriching the  experience  of  the  present.  We are  enabled,  symbolically  and imaginatively,  to
anticipate  situations.  In  countless  ways,  language  condenses  meanings  that  record  social
outcomes and presage social outlooks” (MW9: 43).
5. See MW9: 8. While Dewey later expresses his indebtedness to Mead (see LW12: 5), it is notable
that Mead (1934: 79) makes reference to Dewey’s most elaborate analysis of communication in
chapter 5 of Experience and Nature.
6. See Park & Burgess (1921: 36-8, 182-5).
7. For example, Edward Shils has argued that Park “could not formulate a dynamic theory of
behavior which would have unified his own classificatory and descriptive scheme and helped to
systematize his rich aphoristic insights into modern social structureˮ  (Shils 1948: 10, cited in
Bulmer 1984: 122-3). With regard to the Human Ecology framework outlined by Park and other
members of the Chicago school, Richard C. Helmes-Hayes has pointedly summed up that, “while
formidably broad and ambitious in its scope and enriched by a sensitive tradition of empirical
investigation, [human ecology] is an approach whose theoretical reach exceeded its graspˮ (1987:
397). 
8. See Frega (2019: 80-3). 
9. See Frega (2019: 65-78).
10. In particular, Dewey rejects behaviouristic and physicalistic reductionism regarding mental
or social phenomena (see LW3: 45), or reduction of social and moral phenomena to biological
phenomena (LW3: 52).
11. Dewey briefly considers how “physiological factors of sex, of procreation, immaturity and
need of care” contribute to the organisation of the family (LW3: 48). He further suggests that
social  phenomena,  or  society  at  large,  would  be  sustained  by  physical  and  technological
infrastructures  and  by  material  artifacts:  “land,  including  all  the  natural  resources  (and
obstacles) and forms of energy for which the word ‘land’ stands […] the tools and machines by
which physical energies are utilized […] physical appliances and apparatus,  from clothes and
houses to railways” (LW3: 47).
12. The important texts include “The Inclusive Philosophical Idea” (LW3: 41-54), “Syllabus: Social
Institutions and the Study of Morals” (MW15: 230-72, in particular MW15: 247-69) and “Social
Philosophy” (Dewey 1928). As Phillip Deen has pointed out (2016), the latter lecture notes outline
a theoretical basis for Dewey’s conception of the public.
13. See Frega (2019: 190n20). 
14. One should also note, however, the distinct contribution of Park’s student, Roderick Duncan
McKenzie (1924). As Dennis McDonald has pointed out (2011), there are differences that need to
be taken into account between Mc Kenzie’s contribution, on the one hand, and that of Park and
Burgess, on  the  other.  In  particular,  McKenzie  did  not  subscribe  to  “the  sharp  distinction
between the ecological and the social that Park and Burgess maintained” (2011: 269). McKenzie
rather held that “[s]ociety and the social encompass not only human-to-human relations, but
also vital relations of humans to objects of nature and culture” (2011: 269).
15. “Competition is universal in the world of living things. Under ordinary circumstances it goes
on unobserved even by the individuals who are most concerned” (Park & Burgess 1921: 510). 
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16. Dewey thus considers “[c]ertain physiological factors of sex, of procreation, immaturity and
need  of  care”  (LW3:  48).  In  TPIP he  further  brings  out  how  childrens’  immaturity  and  the
fullfilment of their developmental potentials call for adequate conditions for care and education.
“[T]he period in which education is possible to an effective degree is that of childhood; if this
time is not taken advantage of the consequences are irreparable. The neglect can rarely be made
up  later”  (LW2:  274).  Hence,  he  stresses,  child  labour  has  irreparable  and  irretrievable
consequences both for the child and for society (see LW2: 274 and also Dewey 1928).
17. See MW15: 249.
18. In  his  lecture  notes  from the  same year  (1928)  Dewey  more  dynamically  considers  how
natural,  technological  and artefactual environments are integrated in human production and
consumption,  and  are  constitutive  elements  of  human  development  or  “growth.”  Through
production and consumption,  he points out,  there is  “[d]emand for permanent possession of
means that are means for many wants, not exhausted in consumption – for example [demand for]
land, for money, for owning books, pictures […] This want is met however not only by possession
but by command whenever needed, streets/lights, lighthouses, schools […] tools, instruments,
appliances, machinery” (Dewey 1928).
19. See Midtgarden (2019) for an historical account of Dewey’s concept of the public that focuses
on his practical political support of regulatory policies in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. 
20. See LW2: 274, 316, Dewey (1928). 
21. Considering “the economic-industrial activities that affect the distribution of power, and of
abilities, capacities, enjoyments” (MW15: 247), Dewey particularly notes how vulnerabilities and
dependencies emerge through various modes of consumption (see MW15: 248-69, Dewey 1928).
22. See also LW3: 47 and LW11: 246.
23. See Rick Tilman (1998), Tilman & Knapp (1999).
24. “To be right, [the claim] must be an acknowledged claim, having not the mere power of the
claim-antclaimant behind it, but the emotional and intellectual assent of the community” (LW5:
285). In a more negative and critical perspective, Dewey in DE observes how “[i]ndividuals use
one another so as to get desired results,  without reference to the emotional and intellectual
disposition and consent of those used” (MW9: 8).
25. See also Dewey (2015: 37).
26. See MW15: 268-9.
27. See Mead (1934: 347-53).
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